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Abstract
Illegal logging is a threat to biodiversity and rural livelihoods in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park, the 
largest protected area in the Philippines. Every year between 20,000 and 35,000 cu. m wood is extracted from the 
park. The forestry service and municipal governments tolerate illegal logging in the protected area; government 
offi cials argue that banning an important livelihood activity of households along the forest frontier will aggravate 
rural poverty. However this reasoning underestimates the scale of timber extraction, and masks resource capture 
and collusive corruption. Illegal logging in fact forms an obstacle for sustainable rural development in and around 
the protected area by destroying ecosystems, distorting markets, and subverting the rule of law. Strengthening 
law enforcement and controlling corruption are prerequisites for sustainable forest management in and around 
protected areas in insular southeast Asia.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2005, a village councillor in San Isidro, a small 
barangay (village) on the boundary of the Northern Sierra 
Madre Natural Park (NSMNP) in Isabela province, placed an 
improvised signpost along the road: ‘Informing all homebound 
trucks to drop one board for the barangay hall, church and 
cottage as requested by the barangay councillor AP’. Every 
day four trucks loaded with premium timber pass through San 
Isidro. Each truckload represents a market value of around 
100,000 PHP (Philippine peso; 2,000 USD), roughly twice the 
annual average income of households in this remote village on 
the Philippine forest frontier (National Statistical Coordination 
Board 2007). Most young men in San Isidro make regular trips 
to the forest to haul timber. Government offi cials turn a blind 
eye to the illegal logging activities in the protected area; they 
claim that environmental legislation cannot be enforced as 
the rural poor depend on timber revenues. But not everyone 
benefi ts from logging in San Isidro. Farmers have to cope with 
high transport prices as the heavily loaded logging trucks are 
deteriorating the unpaved roads. Fishermen are confronted with 
declining fi sh catches as rivers are increasingly silted. Hunters 
complain that the constant sound of chainsaws scares wildlife 
away. Tensions have risen in the village over access to forest 
resources and benefi t sharing. How should we read the notice 
in San Isidro? Is it an attempt to capture an equitable share 
of the profi ts of logging for local developmental needs? Is it 
an informal recognition of the needs of the rural poor which 
underlie illegal forest activities? Or is it a silent protest of a 
marginalised community to the ongoing plunder of their forest?
San Isidro exemplifi es the situation prevailing in many 
remote rural areas in the Philippines. Illegal logging, the 
harvesting of timber in contravention of national laws, is a 
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major problem in the management of the country’s protected 
areas (Mallari et al. 2001; Ong et al. 2002).1 In recent years 
public awareness of the detrimental effects of illegal logging 
has grown in the Philippines, especially in relation to fl ooding 
and land slides (Broad & Cavanagh 1993; Goldoftas 2006; 
Chokkalingam et al. 2006). Successive administrations have 
placed illegal logging at the top of the political agenda. In 2000, 
President Estrada created an anti-organised crime commission 
tasked to investigate and prosecute crime syndicates involved 
in illegal logging. After the landslides that killed 1,800 people 
in Quezon Province in 2004, President Arroyo identifi ed illegal 
logging as one the ‘most serious crime against our people’ 
and directed the police and the army to join forces against 
illegal loggers and their fi nanciers ‘the way we do terrorists, 
kidnappers, drug traffi ckers’ (Magallona 2004: 53). But on 
the ground a different reality prevails: the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the national 
government agency mandated to enforce environmental 
legislation, tolerates illegal logging activities. 
The DENR offi cials argue that it is illegitimate to ban 
‘small-scale timber poaching’ of poor rural households; the 
strict enforcement of forestry regulations risks aggravating 
rural poverty and fuelling civil insurgency (Gascon 2001: 
14). Forestry offi cials therefore informally sanction logging 
activities of the rural poor, a strategy locally called ‘humanising 
the law’ (van den Top 1998: 219). The provincial DENR 
director of Isabela, for example, says that people have ‘to resort 
to cutting of trees to sustain their basic needs’ (Lagasca 2008a: 
29). Municipal government offi cials and the DENR offi cials 
claim that illegal logging can only be controlled by providing 
‘alternative livelihood projects’ (Lagasca 2008b: 29).
This paper describes the social dynamics of timber extraction 
in the NSMNP and refl ects on various policy responses to 
address the entwined problems of illegal logging and rural 
poverty in and around protected areas. It disputes the view 
that rural poverty is the driving force behind illegal logging 
operations in the NSMNP. The illegal timber trade in the park 
is controlled by a few businessmen who operate in collusion 
with government offi cials. The pro-poor rhetoric of the DENR 
offi cials actually masks the role of corruption in illegal logging 
operations, and the detrimental social and ecological impacts 
of uncontrolled timber harvesting (Ravnborg 2003; Grainger 
& Malayang III 2006). Illegal logging in the NSMNP creates 
a barrier for sustainable rural development by destroying 
ecosystems, distorting markets, and breeding corruption. 
Policy interventions aimed to counter illegal timber extraction 
by alleviating rural poverty, creating an alternative wood supply 
or enhancing the capacity of the DENR, fail to control illegal 
logging activities in the absence of effective law enforcement. 
Based on recent developments in Isabela where a coalition of 
civil society organisations and the reform-oriented provincial 
governor had remarkable success in controlling illegal logging 
activities, we conclude that improving the rule of law is a 
prerequisite for community-based forest conservation and 
poverty alleviation in insular southeast Asia.
For analytical clarity, we focus exclusively on the harvesting 
and marketing of timber. Fuel wood gathering, bamboo 
harvesting and slash-and-burn farming (kaingin) are important 
economic activities for the rural poor in the Northern Sierra 
Madre, which in theory are illegal under Philippine forestry 
laws, but in practice are tolerated by government offi cials. 
However, in our view there are important differences in ‘the 
level of illegality’ of these livelihood activities (Inoguchi 
et al. 2005). Gathering non-timber forest products such as 
bamboo, rattan or resin has little impact on the protected area. 
Agricultural encroachment is an important proximate cause for 
deforestation in the NSMNP, but unlike timber extraction, it is 
primarily motivated by subsistence needs (Overmars 2006).
METHODS
Illegal logging and associated corruption are by defi nition 
difficult to measure. Philippine forestry statistics are 
notoriously unreliable and are often manipulated for political 
purposes (Kummer 1992). The information presented in this 
paper is, therefore, largely based on insights gained through 
our research and conservation activities in the NSMNP over 
the past nine years (2001–2009). Our involvement in Northern 
Sierra Madre Natural Park Conservation Project, the Multi-
Stakeholder Forest Protection Committee, the Protected Area 
Management Board of the NSMNP, and more recently the 
Anti-illegal Logging Taskforce of the provincial government 
of Isabela gave us an insider’s view of bureaucratic decision-
making processes and local politics.
We mainly rely on fi eld observations and informal interviews 
with municipal government offi cials, forest rangers, traders, 
loggers, and farmers. We kept detailed notes of these informal 
interviews in the different municipalities of the protected area. 
Additional qualitative data on perceptions on environmental 
legislation, fraud, and corruption was collected by Dutch and 
Filipino graduate students who worked under our supervision 
in different barangays along the forest fringe from 1992 to 
2008 (see Appendix for a list of student reports; available 
on request). This information was complemented by a 
comprehensive review of the grey literature on illegal logging 
in the NSMNP (provincial forestry statistics, project reports, 
conference proceedings, and newspaper articles).
Quantitative information on wood extraction volumes was 
collected from 2006 to 2008. In all major river systems in 
the NSMNP we counted log transports, and estimated the 
number of chainsaws based on informal on-site interviews 
with barangay offi cials and farmers at major hauling points 
(barangays along the forest frontier), and with loggers and 
transporters in the extraction areas. Van der Ploeg collected 
data along the Disabungan (barangay Del Pilar), Catalangan 
(Villa Miranda, San Isidro), and Ilaguen (Tappa, Ibujan) 
rivers in the municipality of San Mariano from February to 
May 2007. During the same period, Arnold Macadangdang, 
our fi eld assistant, collected information along Pinacanauan 
de Tumauini (Antagan), Bintacan River (Batong Labang), 
and Abuan River (Cabeseria 27). Information in Pinacanauan 
de San Pablo (Tupa) and Puerta (Dy Abra and Masipi East) 
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was collected in July and August 2007 by van der Ploeg. Van 
Weerd and van der Ploeg conducted surveys along the Pacifi c 
Coast in March 2006 and January 2008 (in the municipalities 
of Divilacan and Palanan). In general, loggers and middlemen 
were transparent about their activities during informal 
interviews. We did not experience any form of obstruction or 
threats during fi eldwork. The information gathered in the fi eld 
was validated during interviews with key informants working 
for government, civil society groups, and universities in the 
region.
Information on forest protection activities was obtained 
from the regional offi ce of the DENR in Tuguegarao, and the 
offi ce of the provincial governor in Ilagan. The provincial 
offi ce of the DENR in Ilagan did not respond to our requests 
for information.
THE NORTHERN SIERRA MADRE NATURAL PARK
The NSMNP covers an area of 359,486 ha, of which 287,861 
ha are terrestrial habitats (Mallari et al. 2001). The NSMNP 
is one of the 10 priority protected areas in the Philippines: 
it holds 25% of the remaining primary lowland forest of the 
archipelago (Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology 
& Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1998). 
The park has remarkably high levels of endemism: 30% of 
bird species and 62% of mammal species recorded in the 
NSMNP are endemic to the Philippines. Thirty-fi ve globally 
threatened species are recorded in the protected area, including 
the critically endangered Philippine eagle Pithecophaga 
jefferyi and the Philippine crocodile Crocodylus mindorensis. 
By protecting the NSMNP, a large proportion of the region’s 
biodiversity will be maintained. 
The NSMNP covers a large part of the Northern Sierra Madre 
mountain range.2 The park includes nine municipalities in the 
province of Isabela: San Pablo, Cabagan, Tumauini, Ilagan 
and San Mariano in the Cagayan Valley, and Maconacon, 
Divilacan, Palanan and Dinapigue along the Pacifi c Coast 
(Figure 1). Around 25,000 people live within the NSMNP 
boundaries, mainly on the narrow coastal strip. The indigenous 
people of the Northern Sierra Madre, the Agta, now form a 
minority in the protected area; approximately 1,800 Agta live 
in and directly adjacent to the NSMNP (Minter 2010). Their 
livelihood activities consist mainly of hunting, fi shing, collecting 
forest products, and swidden agriculture. Palanan is the largest 
population centre in the park with 16,000 people. It has been a 
permanent settlement for more than 300 years. Maconacon and 
Figure 1
Logging hotspots in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park 
A. Pinacanauan de San Pablo, B. Puerta, C. Pinacanauan de Tumauini, D. Bintacan, E. Abuan, 
F. Catalangan, G. Disabungan, H. Ilaguen, J. Divilacan, K. Palanan River, L. Palanan Coast
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Divilacan are much smaller towns, which were created in the 
1970s by logging corporations. Along the Pacifi c Coast fi shing is 
an important source of income. Coconut plantations and irrigated 
rice are the most important farming systems. 
In the western side of the protected area, population centres 
are located relatively far from the park boundary. Around 
32,000 people reside in 24 barangays along the forest frontier. 
In the uplands of Cagayan Valley, corn, bananas, and upland 
rice are the main agricultural products. The majority of people 
are Ilocano immigrants who migrated to Isabela in the 1950s. 
Corporate logging led to a second wave of immigrants in the 
1980s; aided by logging roads farmers settled in the secondary 
forests of the Northern Sierra Madre (van den Top 1998; Seki 
2004). A contemporary development is the infl ow of Ifugao 
immigrants, who create small settlements in the forest (van der 
Ploeg et al. 2007). Most people in and around the NSMNP live 
below the poverty threshold, and depend on forest resources 
for food and cash (Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 2001a). Another 1.5 million people in Cagayan 
Valley rely on the hydrological services the NSMNP provides. 
All land in the NSMNP is classifi ed as ‘forest land’ and 
thus offi cially belongs to the state, with the exception of the 
privately-owned lowlands along the coast. 
In 1979, President Ferdinand Marcos declared all public 
lands within a 45 mile (72 km) radius around Palanan as the 
Palanan Wilderness area (Letter of Instruction 917-A), with 
the dual objective of protecting forest resources and countering 
the civil insurgency that gripped northeast Luzon. In practice 
this meant very little: in the early 1980s, at the height of 
the ‘logging boom’, there were 44 concessions active in the 
Northern Sierra Madre, legally extracting 2 million cu. m wood 
per year (van den Top 1998: 285). Cronyism, corruption, and 
anarchy characterised the corporate logging industry during 
the Marcos administration (1965–1986) (Vitug 1993). In most 
cases the concession holders, well-connected businessmen, 
army offi cers, and politicians in Manila, sub-contracted the 
logging operations to entrepreneurs in Isabela province. These 
sub-contractors organised the logging operations and paid 
royalties to the concession holders. The so-called ‘Bataan-
system’ became the dominant mode of operation; timber 
was extracted from the forest by teams using a bulldozer, 
chainsaws and several logging trucks. The labourers, often 
hired from upland communities, were paid by the volume of 
timber produced. Silviculture regulations were violated to 
maximise profi ts: areas were clear cut, logging roads were 
improperly constructed, annual allowable cuts were exceeded, 
protected species were harvested, logging took place outside 
or in suspended concessions, and reforestation efforts were 
minimal. These illegal practices were tolerated by government 
foresters in exchange for personal favours and payments (van 
den Top 1998). 
The democratisation and decentralisation processes that 
followed the People Power revolution of 1986 had profound 
effects on corporate logging and protected area management. 
In 1991, there remained 10 active forestry concessions in 
the Northern Sierra Madre with an annual allowable cut of 
241,600 cu. m (Danielsen et al. 1994). In 1992, in the wake 
of the Ormoc tragedy in which more than 5,000 people died in 
mudslides on Leyte, the Aquino administration (1986–1992) 
issued a ban on commercial logging in all primary forests 
in Ilagan and San Mariano (Guiang 2001; Persoon & van 
der Ploeg 2003). Logging operation in Maconacon stopped 
in 1992, after the sawmill and staff quarters of the Southern 
Plywood Corporation—one of the largest concessions in the 
Northern Sierra Madre—were attacked and burned to the 
ground by the New People’s Army (NPA), allegedly because 
the company had refused to pay the so-called ‘revolutionary 
taxes’. Most logging companies were blackmailed by the 
Maoist insurgents and had to provide food, fuel, and cash 
(Goldoftas 2006). At present only three logging companies 
legally harvest wood in areas adjacent to the NSMNP.3 
After the fall of President Marcos in 1986, the country 
adopted a progressive forest policy that emphasised 
participatory decision-making and equitable access to natural 
resources (Walpole et al. 1993). The National Integrated 
Protected Area System Act (Republic Act 7586) of 1992 
provided a new regulatory framework for biodiversity 
conservation in the Philippines. Substantial investments 
were made by international donors to build the capacity 
of the DENR, municipal governments and civil society 
organisations (World Bank 2003). Two internationally-funded 
projects aimed to support the DENR in the proclamation and 
management of the NSMNP; the Conservation of Priority 
Protected Areas of the Philippines project, which was 
implemented by a consortium of civil society organisations 
called NGOs for Integrated Protected Areas from 1994 to 
2002 funded by the Global Environment Facility; and the 
Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park-Conservation Project, 
which was implemented by Plan International from 1996 
to 2002 funded by the Dutch government (Persoon & van 
Weerd 2006). In 1997, the Palanan Wilderness Area was 
enlarged and renamed the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park 
(Presidential Proclamation 978). A management plan with a 
zoning system should regulate local use of forest resources. 
All inhabited areas became multiple use zones; the rest was 
designated as strict protection zone. The Northern Sierra 
Madre Natural Park Act (Republic Act 9125) was adopted 
in 2001. At present only nine other protected areas in the 
Philippines have been proclaimed by Congress. But despite 
the legal recognition and international funding, the NSMNP 
remains a ‘paper park’.
In theory the DENR and local stakeholders co-manage the 
NSMNP through the Protected Area Management Board. This 
management board consists of the mayors of the municipalities 
in the park, the head of the environmental service of the 
provincial government, the director of the provincial DENR, 
civil society organisations, barangay captains (village 
leaders), and representatives from farmers’ cooperatives, 
indigenous peoples, and youth and women groups. The offi ce 
of the Protected Area Superintendent, based in Palanan, is 
mandated to enforce the NSMNP Act and the resolutions of 
the management board. All timber harvested in the NSMNP 
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is by defi nition illegal.4 In practice, however, environmental 
legislation and resolutions of the Protected Area Management 
Board are seldom enforced. 
ILLEGAL LOGGING
Illegal logging poses a serious threat to biodiversity and rural 
livelihoods in the NSMNP (Nordic Agency for Development 
and Ecology & Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 1998; Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 2001a). Timber is harvested in all lowland 
dipterocarp forest areas of the protected area, particularly 
on the western side (Figure 1). We estimate that 20,000 to 
35,000 cu. m wood per year is illegally extracted from the 
NSMNP, representing a minimal market value of 238 million 
PHP (4,750,000 USD). By way of comparison: the annual 
allowable cut of the three remaining logging concessions in 
Isabela combined is 37,794 cu. m. 
We identifi ed 11 illegal logging hotspots in the NSMNP. In 
the Cagayan Valley, timber extraction is concentrated along 
all major river systems of the protected area, most notably 
the Abuan River and the Bintacan River in Ilagan, and the 
Catalangan River, the Disabungan River, and the Ilaguen River 
in San Mariano (Figure 1). Here wood is transported out of the 
protected area by river. In San Pablo, Cabagan and Tumauini 
logging activities are taking place on a much smaller scale; in 
this area most timber stands are located at an elevation of 800 m 
and are commercially less interesting. Accessibility is the main 
factor why illegal logging is relatively limited in Divilacan and 
Palanan. Produced volumes of timber, payment arrangements, 
and profit margins vary considerably by location, which 
explains the wide ranges of our calculations (Table 1). 
Illegal timber extraction (locally called salabadiok) in the 
NSMNP is fi nanced by seven prominent businessmen in the 
urban centres of the province. In most cases, these fi nanciers 
are registered lumber dealers or timber plantations owners, 
which enable them to legalise illegal wood. We estimate 
that the seven fi nanciers in Cagayan Valley jointly have an 
annual net profi t of 42–200 million PHP (840,000–4,000,000 
USD). The financiers operate through middlemen in the 
Table 1
Illegal logging hotspots in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park (2007)
Logging hotspots 
(Hauling points)
No. of 
chainsawsa
No. of 
labourers
Annual extraction 
(cu. m)
Market valueb 
(PHP)
Missed forest chargesc 
(PHP)
A. Pinacanauan de San 
Pablo (Tupa) 
10 60 377-755 3,996,200-8,003,000 527,800-1,057,000 
B. Puerta (Dy Abra, 
Masipi East) 
15 120 566-1,132 5,999,600-11,999,200 792,400-1,584,800 
C. Pinacanauan de 
Tumauini (Antagan) 
5 60 189-377 2,003,400-3,996,200 264,600-527,800 
D. Bintacan River 
(Batong Labang) 
20 100 755-1,509 8,003,000-15,995,400 1,057,000-2,112,600 
E. Abuan River 
(Cabeseria 27)
100 500 2,830-7,547 29,998,000-79,998,200 3,962,000-10,565,800 
F. Catalangan River (Villa
Miranda, San Isidro) 
50 400 3,774-6,792 40,004,400-71,995,200 5,283,600-9,508,800 
G. Disabungan River 
(Del Pilar) 
70 560 5,283-8,491 55,999,800-90,004,600 7,396,200-11,887,400 
H. Ilaguen River (Tappa, 
Ibujan) 
80 640 6,038-7,075 64,002,800-74,995,000 8,453,200-9,905,000 
J. Divilacan coast (Dilakit, 
Dimasalansan, Bicobian)
25 200 354-382 9,756,240-10,527,920 1,062,000-1,146,000 
K. Palanan River 
(Dilacnadanom, Culasi)
30 240 382-425 10,527,920-11,713,000 1,146,000-1,275,000 
L. Palanan Coast 
(Didadungan, Divinisa, 
Dimatatno)
20 200 283-509 7,799,480-14,028,040 849,000-1,527,000 
Total 425 3,080 20,831-34,994 238,090,840-393,255,760 30,793,800-51,097,200 
a. Based on fi eld observations and interviews, we estimated the number of chainsaws and the number of bugadores in every logging hotspot, which enabled us to 
compute annual timber extraction rates for the year 2007. We assumed that on the western side loggers harvest 1,000 to 2,000 bdft (2.35 to 4.7 cu. m) per trip and 
make two trips per month from February to September (8 months per year). On the Pacifi c Coast loggers harvest 500 to 2,000 bdft per trip and work only in the dry 
season (6 months per year). An example: the annual extraction rate along Pinacanauan de San Pablo was calculated as follows: 10 chainsaws * 1,000 bdft * 2 trips 
* 8 months = 160,000 bdft/424 = 377 cu. m. In San Mariano (Catalangan, Disabungan and Ilaguen) these estimations were substantiated with information on the 
number of logging trucks leaving the collection points, and on the Pacifi c Coast the number of boats transporting wood (determined by repeated fi eld observations). 
Forest guards and barangay offi cials have detailed information on illegal wood production as bribes are paid per bdft. The accuracy of the information presented 
in the table was validated by an aerial survey of the NSMNP by the provincial government in 2008, which determined the number of logging trucks and logging 
camps in the NSMNP and estimated the amount of wood in the clandestine sawmills (pers. comm. R. Araño 2008). b. Market value was calculated based on 
2007 wood prices: 25 PHP per bdft (as most timber on the western side is softwood), thereby most probably underestimating the market value. On the Pacifi c 
Coast however we used 65 PHP per bdft, as most timber is narra.  c. Missed forest charges are based on DENR regulations specifying forest taxes (Department 
Administrative Order 2000-63). These missed forest charges are hypothetical as marketing wood from a protected area is by defi nition illegal.  
Note: the letters A to L refer to the locations mentioned in Figure 1.
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remote villages. The middlemen, often barangay offi cials, 
organise specialised logging teams to harvest timber in the 
forest. Without connections to a middleman and fi nancier, it 
is impossible to transport or sell timber in Isabela. Financiers 
and middlemen claim exclusive extraction rights to specifi c 
areas in the forest, the so-called ‘area-area’ system. Sometimes 
these ‘concessions’ are marked with signboards. Middlemen 
organise logging teams, order a certain amount of timber and 
provide a cash-advance for fuel and supplies, which is deducted 
from the payment upon delivery of the timber. 
The logging teams consist of surveyors, a chainsaw operator, 
helpers, and transporters. The surveyors identify suitable trees 
for harvesting. Sometimes Agta are hired as surveyors (Minter 
2010). The chainsaw operators, locally called atcheros, are 
often former skilled employees of the logging companies 
(Figure 2). The helpers carry the equipment, fuel and supplies, 
maintain the chainsaw and prepare the food. The transporters, 
bugadores, are responsible to transport the timber to the hauling 
points. In most cases these young men, between 16 and 30 years 
old, are recruited from the barangays along the forest frontier. 
We estimate that around 3,000 men are working in the illegal 
logging operations in the NSMNP (Table 1). This is consistent 
with earlier estimations that around 50% of the households in 
the barangays directly adjacent to the western boundary of the 
NSMNP are involved in illegal logging operations (Laarman 
et al. 1995; Seki 2004; Hobbes & Kleijn 2007). 
The logging teams make regular logging trips of 5–10 
days in the forest, depending on the location. The bugadores 
transport the timber through the rivers to the collection points 
and travel back with supplies: a complex logistical operation. 
Bugadores usually make two trips per month to haul timber. 
It takes two to fi ve days to transport the timber to the hauling 
points. Logging mainly takes place in the dry season from 
February to September. The working conditions in illegal 
logging operations are harsh: felling, sawing, and transporting 
timber through the river are hazardous activities, and there 
are often accidents. In the rainy season, the harvesting and 
transport of timber becomes too diffi cult. 
The logging teams make temporary camps along the rivers. 
The chainsaw operator fells the tree and saws the log into 
square beams (fl itches) at the felling site. All trees that exceed 
a diameter of 1 foot (30.48 cm) are harvested. Water-buffaloes 
(carabaos) are used for skidding the logs to the camps, which 
function as log landings. Loggers light forest fi res to facilitate 
skidding. In the camp, the square beams are sawn into 2 inch 
(5.08 cm) thick boards: dos lapad. Large rafts, sometimes more 
than 25 m long, are constructed to facilitate the transport of these 
boards through the river. The boards are kept afl oat with interior 
tire tubes. Approximately 60–70% of the wood is wasted as a 
result of chainsaw milling and transportation over water (van 
den Top 1998). The bugadores transport the rafts to a hauling 
point in the lowlands where the lumber is loaded into trucks, 
and transported to a saw mill. Trucks load 3,000 to 5,000 bdft 
(board foot; 7 cu. m to 11 cu. m). The saw mills, locally called 
simpin, process the lumber. From here the wood is distributed 
to lumber dealers or furniture makers in the region, or directly 
transported to the urban centres in Central Luzon. 
Timber is primarily harvested in riparian forest. Narra 
(Pterocarpus indicus) is the preferred timber species, primarily 
used for furniture. It is however becoming increasingly scarce 
on the western side of the NSMNP (van den Top 1998). Here, 
loggers mainly harvest other species: white lauan (Shorea 
contorta), red lauan (Shorea negrosensis), mayapis (Shorea 
squamata), yakal (Shorea astylosa), guiho (Shorea guiso), 
tanguile (Shorea polysperma), tindalo (Afzelia rhomboidea), 
and almaciga (Agathis philippinensis). These species, locally 
called ‘soft wood’, are mainly used for construction. In the 
coastal municipalities, loggers focus specifi cally on narra. 
Here, the wood is transported from the hauling points by 
motorised boats to saw mills in Central Luzon (particularly in 
the harbours of Mauban and Infanta). These bancas can load 
up to 9,000 bdft per trip (21 cu. m). 
In general, the logging teams are paid per board foot of 
lumber by the middlemen. A chainsaw operator receives 2 to 
3 PHP per bdft (Table 2). A skilled chainsaw operator can earn 
around 400 PHP (8 USD) per day. Bugadores and helpers are 
paid 1 to 2 PHP per bdft per trip (around 120–150 PHP per day, 
i.e., 2.4–3.0 USD per day). This makes logging one of the most 
profi table income generating activities in the forest frontier 
(van den Top 1998; Aquino 2004). Middlemen are also paid by 
the volume produced: 3.5 to 5 PHP per bdft. All payments are 
done on consignment, which places the bugadores at risk: if 
illegal timber is confi scated by the authorities they are not paid. 
The credit system is an important characteristic of the logging 
operations in the NSMNP, and makes it diffi cult to determine 
production volumes, profi t margins and spending patterns. It 
creates a strong patronage bond between the middlemen and 
the bugadores that extends beyond logging; often credit for 
agricultural inputs is paid back with logging revenues (Huigen 
& Jens 2006). In interviews, loggers also often cite the need to 
pay school fees of children and siblings. A considerable part 
of the money earned in logging is spent on alcohol, tobacco, 
and prostitutes.
Many young men are attracted to the outdoor life and the 
‘easy money’. But other people in communities along the forest 
Figure 2
Chainsaw operator in Abuan, Ilagan
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frontier are confronted with the negative impacts of logging. 
Farmers complain that logging trucks destroy farm-to-market 
roads. Fishers claim that fi sh catches have declined as a result 
of erosion and silting. The Agta mention that loggers disturb 
wildlife, destroy swiddens, and harass women (Minter 2010). 
The wives of the bugadores are concerned about the harsh 
working conditions in the forest. In many upland villages there 
is a shortage of labour as many young men are working in the 
forest. Most people living in and around the NSMNP know that 
harvesting and transporting timber is against the law.5 There 
is growing awareness on the negative environmental impacts 
of logging, but barangay offi cials feel disempowered to do 
anything about the uncontrolled timber extraction. 
CORRUPTION
Timber from the protected area is legally processed and 
marketed in Isabela. The Department of Trade and Industries, 
and municipal governments have issued licenses to 148 
furniture shops in the fi ve municipalities on the western 
side of the protected area. It is estimated that these furniture 
shops process more than 9,215 cu. m of illegally harvested 
hardwood per year, mainly for the domestic market (van den 
Top 1998: 171; Greenpeace 2006: 19). In addition, there are 
eight registered lumber dealers in San Mariano and Ilagan, 
who legally sell and transport the timber harvested in the 
protected areas to the urban centres in Central Luzon. The 
furniture makers form the largest manufacturing sector in 
Isabela province, employing approximately 1,500 people.6
The incongruence between illegally harvested timber and 
the legal sale of lumber and furniture is solved by fraud and 
corruption.7 Middlemen collude with the DENR offi cials to 
authenticate illegal wood through a variety of legal loopholes. 
A popular method is the issuance of permits for supposedly 
damaged or dead wood that has washed ashore after typhoons 
or residual timber left in the forest by logging companies in the 
1980s. This practice has generated a fl ow of so-called ‘salvaged 
logs’ or ‘tops and branches’ to the furniture shops (van den Top 
1998: 226). Another way to legalise illegal wood is the ‘old-
stock’ method (Aquino 2004: 269). Over the past 15 years, the 
furniture industry was on several occasions granted an amnesty 
that enabled the shops to legally sell their clandestine wood 
on the condition that they would make a transition to gmelina 
(yemane) or mahogany from plantations in the region. But 
stocks were over-declared with tacit approval of the DENR 
offi cials and are continuously replenished (Greenpeace 2006: 
21). Transport permits are forged or ‘recycled’: several wood 
transports are covered by the same permit (Nordic Agency 
for Development and Ecology & Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources 1998). In other cases, wood is simply 
transported and sold without any permits or receipts.8
Middlemen bribe forest guards to secure passage for logging 
trucks at checkpoints and issue certifi cates. In many areas 
these payments are fi xed: in San Mariano 1 PHP per bdft goes 
to the DENR offi cials. We estimate that 8–14 million PHP 
(160,000–280,000 USD) per year is paid in bribes to the DENR 
offi cials in Isabela. The DENR offi cials are not in this alone; 
the NPA is also claiming ‘revolutionary taxes’ from the logging 
syndicates: 1 PHP per bdft. Loggers sometimes also have to 
provide food and gasoline to the insurgents. Several barangays 
on the forest frontier have set up checkpoints and demand 
50 PHP (1 USD) per logging truck, or several boards for the 
construction of a school or a barangay hall as happened in 
San Isidro. Furthermore, to pass the checkpoints of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police a 
payment of 1,500 PHP (30 USD) per truck is usually required. 
To transport wood from Isabela to Central Luzon trucks have 
to pass at least 11 checkpoints along the national highway 
(United States Agency for International Development 2004). 
Bribes are paid in order to ignore environmental legislation, 
evade forest charges, and maximise profi ts. 
Senior DENR offi cials often downplay these ‘standard 
operating procedures’ (van den Top 1998: 231) as ‘petty 
corruption’, in which forest guards receive small bribes to look 
the other way so that the rural poor can meet their needs. But 
corruption associated with illegal logging operations in the 
NSMNP can best be described as collusive corruption, in which 
the fi nanciers conspire with government offi cials to avoid 
regulations and taxes (Laurance 2004; Smith et al. 2007). In 
some cases, the interests of these actors is so closely interwoven 
that rent seizing occurs; local politicians and government 
officials actively undermine institutional safeguards and 
legislation to capture timber revenues for private gain (Ross 
2001; Kishor & Damania 2007). Illegal logging is deeply 
entrenched in political patronage networks in Isabela (Coronel 
et al. 2004). Several fi nanciers in Isabela hold prominent 
political positions in the province. Election campaigns are 
fi nanced with money generated by illegal timber extraction 
(Inoguchi et al. 2005). The DENR offi cials feel pressured by 
elected politicians: ‘if I confi scate the wrong timber transport 
Table 2
Costs of wood production in the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park
Costs per bdft (PHP) % of total
Direct costs
 Fuel (gasoil and oil) 0.5-1.0 2-4
 Supplies (food, cigarettes, gin) 0.5-1.0 2-4
Labour costs
 Surveyor 1.0-1.5 4-6
 Chainsaw operator 2.0-3.0 8-12
 Helper 1.0-1.5 4-6
 Hauler 1.5-2.0 6-8
 Transport (truck) 1.0-2.0 4-8
 Middleman 3.5-5.0 14-20
Bribes
 DENR 0.0-1.0 0-4
 NPA 0.0-1.0 0-4
 Armed Forces of the 
 Philippines
0.0-0.5 0-2
 Philippine National Police 0.0-0.5 0-2
Profi ts
 Financiers 5.0-14.0 20-56
Source: Informal interviews with atcheros and bugadores
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I risk being transferred to the Sulus’. As a result, forest guards 
have little confi dence in the police or the judicial system; the 
few cases against middlemen and bugadores that are fi led in 
municipal trial courts are dismissed or settled. 
The failure to enforce environmental legislation, and the 
persistent allegations of corruption undermine the credibility 
and legitimacy of the DENR (Masipiqueña 1993; van der Ploeg 
& van Weerd 2004). Law enforcement in the NSMNP by the 
DENR is a farce. The DENR forest guards rarely patrol in the 
uplands; the remote and rugged terrain and the civil insurgency 
make this impossible, according to DENR offi cials (Harrison 
et al. 2004). Instead, the DENR has set up several check points 
at strategic locations to prevent the transport of timber, for 
example in Cabeseria 27, Masipi East, and San Mariano town. 
Table 3 gives an overview of illegal timber confi scations by 
the DENR in Isabela from 2003 to 2007. In 2006, the amount 
of illegal wood intercepted by the DENR was at an all time 
high. It earned the provincial director of the DENR, Felix 
Taguba, nationwide recognition as the ‘outstanding forester 
of the year’ (Cadabona 2007: 19). However, none of these 
confi scations have actually led to a conviction in court. Based 
on our estimates, the DENR did not confi scate more than 2.6% 
of the volume extracted from the protected area in that year. In 
interviews, forest guards admit that confi scations are actually 
often staged to meet confi scation targets; bugadores surrender 
several boards at the DENR checkpoints to secure passage. 
POLICY INTERVENTIONS
Policy interventions to control illegal logging are based on 
several fl awed assumptions on the scale and organisation of the 
timber trade.9 First, it is argued that as poor households along 
the forest fringe depend on timber revenues it is illegitimate 
to enforce forestry regulations without fi rst alleviating rural 
poverty (Inoguchi et al. 2005; Custodio & Molinyawe 
2001). This argument has initiated a multitude of ‘alternative 
livelihood projects’ that aim to reduce the dependency 
of rural communities on timber revenues, for example, 
by adopting agro-forestry, marketing non-timber forest 
products, developing irrigation facilities, organising farmers’ 
cooperatives, or improving access to basic public services such 
as health care, education, and infrastructure. However most of 
these efforts fail to control illegal logging (Utting 2000). The 
Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park–Conservation Project for 
example built schools, trained village leaders, assisted farmers 
to secure land tenure, and distributed fruit trees to farmers in 
an effort to create a ‘social fence’ around the NSMNP. This 
integrated conservation and development project enabled 
upland farmers to establish agro-forestry farms in the buffer 
zone of the NSMNP; people now harvest citrus, coconut, and 
yemane. But in the absence of monitoring and enforcement, 
the atcheros and bugadores continued to harvest timber in the 
protected area (General 2005: 197). 
Second, it is thought that by creating an alternative supply 
of wood, illegal logging activities will be minimised (Guiang 
2001). This thinking is based on the insight that the closure 
of most corporate logging concessions lead to a scarcity of 
legal wood in the domestic market. Efforts have been made to 
reform the Philippine wood industry, mainly by promoting the 
establishment of smallholder tree plantations and by issuing 
Community-based Forest Management Agreements to upland 
communities (Chokkalingam et al. 2006). However, both 
strategies have failed to reduce illegal logging activities (Lasco 
& Pulhin 2006). In Isabela, the community-based forestry 
program was plagued by mismanagement and fraud, and 
widely misused to authenticate illegal wood from the NSMNP 
(Tarun-Acay 2004). The failure to enforce environmental 
legislation actually impedes the development of a sustainable 
and legal wood industry; throughout the province farmers 
have established yemane and mahogany plantations but the 
availability of cheap, illegal lumber depresses wood prices 
(Masipiqueña et al. 2008; Seki 2004). Despite the availability 
of legal wood from plantations, the furniture makers continue 
to use illegal narra. 
Third, it is argued that forest protection activities should be 
based on inclusive multi-stakeholder co-management processes 
(DENR 1997; Food and Agriculture Organisation 2005). This 
vision has led to the establishment of Multi-sectoral Forest 
Protection Committees and the formation of local protection 
groups (Bantay Kalikasan and Bantay Gubat) throughout the 
Philippines. The National Integrated Protected Areas System 
Act clearly refl ects the idea that participation minimises forest 
crime; every protected area is managed by a Protected Area 
Management Board in which all important stakeholders are 
represented. But the call for broad societal involvement in 
forest protection currently serves as an apology for the inability 
of the DENR to enforce forestry regulations. The Multi-sectoral 
Forest Protection Committee in the Northern Sierra Madre has 
been a failure, mainly because of confl icts with the DENR 
(Guzman 2003). The deputation of NGO staff, church leaders, 
fi shermen, and indigenous people has led to much frustration; 
the DENR offi cials rarely respond to information on illegal 
logging activities, which fuels suspicion of corruption. On 
several occasions names of informants (including ours) 
have leaked from the DENR offi cials to the middlemen and 
fi nanciers. The same problem paralyses the Protected Area 
Management Board of the NSMNP; illegal logging activities 
Table 3
Total volume of wood confi scated in Isabela (2003–2009)
Year Confi scated 
wood (cu. m)
% of estimated annual illegal wood 
extraction in NSMNP
DENR (Source: Regional DENR)
2003 190 1.5-3.0
2004 129 0.7-1.1
2005 219 0.8-1.3
2006 478 1.7-2.6
2007 67 0.2-0.3
Provincial anti-illegal task force (Source: P. Fernandez pers. comm.)
2008 1,212 3-5
2009 2,883* 23-47
*As of 1 October 2009
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are regularly reported by representatives, but the DENR does 
not take action (Perez & Minter 2004). 
Fourth, to address forest crime it is deemed necessary 
to reform the legal framework (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation & International Tropical Timber Organisation 
2005). Despite the fundamental policy reforms in the early 
1990s aimed to foster ‘good governance’, there remain calls for 
the creation of a macro-coherent forest policy (Utting 2000). 
As we have seen, illegal logging operations in the NSMNP 
thrive in a seemingly biased, inconsistent, and over-regulated 
forest policy framework. Most producers, consumers, and 
municipal government offi cials do not fully understand the 
technical details of forestry regulations (Masipiqueña et al. 
2008). Obtaining permits is a time-consuming and complex 
process (United States Agency for International Development 
2004). Loggers, consumers, and furniture makers think that 
legal restrictions are just a means for the DENR offi cials to 
extract money (Greenpeace 2006). Law enforcement in the 
NSMNP is further hampered by institutional confl icts within 
the DENR (between district, provincial, regional, and national 
offi ces), between the DENR and municipal governments, 
and between the DENR and the National Commission on 
Indigenous Peoples. However, the permanent chaos and 
confusion that characterises forest policy implementation in 
the Northern Sierra Madre is to a certain extent deliberately 
created and maintained by the DENR offi cials (Garrity et al. 
2001). Rules are selectively interpreted and implemented. 
The diffi culties with the implementation of the Chainsaw Act 
(RA 9175) show that the formulation of new policies will 
not provide any solution. Since 2002 all chainsaws should be 
registered by the DENR; a straightforward measure to control 
illegal logging. In 2008, the DENR issued 43 chainsaw (merely 
10% of the chainsaws active in the protected area) permits to 
registered lumber dealers and wood producers in Isabela (Table 
1). Chainsaws can be heard daily along the rivers inside the 
protected area. In the barangays along the western boundary of 
the NSMNP, numerous chainsaw repair shops continue to serve 
customers, sometimes next to the DENR checkpoints. Since 
2003, the DENR has confi scated 21 unregistered chainsaws 
(less than 5% of the estimated total number of chainsaws 
in the park) in the NSMNP. Efforts aimed at ‘harmonising 
forest policies’ distract attention from the real challenges of 
improving law enforcement and controlling corruption in the 
ranks of the DENR (Global Environment Facility 2008). 
Finally, capacity building of the forestry service is often 
seen as the solution for the illegal logging problem (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation 2005). Over the past two decades, 
substantial investments have been made by international donors 
to enhance the institutional capability and accountability of 
the DENR. The results have been limited; the DENR is still 
plagued by high overhead costs (95% of the total budget) 
and corruption (World Bank 2003). The NSMNP remains 
structurally under-staffed and under-funded; the offi ce of the 
protected area superintendent has two cars, fi ve motorbikes, 
and two boats to manage a protected area of almost 360,000 
ha. However, logistical, fi nancial, and personnel constraints 
are too often used as excuses for incompetence, corruption 
or political interference (Grainer & Malayang III 2006). 
The provincial director of the DENR for example repeatedly 
claimed that ‘there is only one forest ranger for every 4,601 ha’ 
(Lagasca 2006: A-25). He added that ‘despite these personnel 
and budgetary constraints we are still able to minimise, if not 
totally control illegal logging in the province’. In fact the 
protected area superintendent and the district offi ces of the 
DENR in Naguilian and Cabagan jointly employ 222 people 
who could, in theory, effectively monitor and control the 11 
logging hotspots in the NSMNP (Table 1). The reasoning that 
the DENR offi cials are prime candidates for bribery because 
their salaries are too low (Broad & Cavanagh 1993) is also 
fl awed. A forest ranger in Isabela earns around 8,000 PHP 
(160 USD) per month, excluding fi eld allowances, insurance 
premiums, and other benefi ts. The higher ranking DENR 
offi cials earn considerably more; the monthly net salary of a 
district offi cer is around 20,000 PHP (400 USD), a middle-class 
income in the Philippines (National Statistical Coordination 
Board 2007). The additional benefi ts, pension, and security 
makes the DENR an attractive employer. Capacity building 
will not stop illegal logging without fundamental political and 
bureaucratic reforms (Tacconi 2007).
CONCLUSION: 
THE PRIMACY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
In this paper, we have argued that illegal logging in the NSMNP 
is not a small-scale livelihood activity of the rural poor as is 
often claimed by government offi cials. The amount of timber 
harvested in the protected area is comparable to a commercial 
logging concession. Although logging generates cash for men 
along the forest frontier to meet short term needs, it undermines 
sustainable rural development in the long term by destroying 
the resource-base on which rural communities depend, eroding 
the rule of law, and distorting markets (Brack 2007; Kaimowitz 
2007). Most profi ts are captured by middlemen and fi nanciers 
who operate in collusion with government offi cials. The 
argument that strict law enforcement aggravates rural poverty 
and fuels the civil insurgency is misused by DENR and local 
government officials to mask the detrimental impacts of 
timber extraction and to cover collusive corruption (Grainger 
& Malayang III 2006; Richards et al. 2003). 
Recent developments in Isabela show that illegal logging 
can effectively be controlled by enforcing existing policies. 
In August 2008, the reform-oriented governor of Isabela 
province, Grace Padaca, set up the Provincial Anti-illegal 
Logging Taskforce.10 Pressured by the diocese of Ilagan and 
local environmental groups who stressed the negative social 
and environmental impacts of illegal logging, and anxious to 
take on her political opponents who allegedly fi nanced their 
electoral campaigns with logging revenues, Padaca decided to 
take action against illegal logging.11 Despite fi erce opposition 
from the DENR and municipal governments, four checkpoints 
were set up and manned by staff of the provincial government, 
the army, the police, and volunteers of the public interest 
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political patronage systems in Kalimantan, and how local 
politicians legitimise resource plunder by using concerns 
about the well-being of rural communities. Strengthening 
the rule of law is widely regarded as a prerequisite to address 
unprecedented forest loss in Indonesia, but how to do this in 
the current socio-political context remains elusive (Jepson et al. 
2001; Sodhi et al. 2006). The experiences with the Provincial 
Anti-illegal Logging Taskforce in Isabela suggest that the 
devolution and democratisation processes that are reshaping 
power relations in the region offer an opportunity to improve 
forest protection. Much can be gained if international donors 
would support decentralised forest protection initiatives. A 
starting point would be to enable civil society groups to hold the 
DENR and local government offi cials accountable, if necessary 
in criminal court (Glastra 1999; Ross 2001; Colchester et al. 
2006). In the Philippines, existing legislation provides enough 
possibilities to do so; in the NSMNP Act a special provision is 
made to act against government offi cials who ‘shall unjustifi ably 
refuse or refrain from instituting prosecution or shall tolerate 
the commission of offences’ (Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources 2001b: 24). In this light, the proliferation 
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Figure 3
Civil society protest against logging, San Mariano 
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Figure 4
Wood confi scated by the provincial anti-illegal logging taskforce, Ilagan
environmental law group Tanggol Kalikasan. In 18 months, 
the Provincial Anti-illegal Logging Taskforce confi scated more 
than 4,000 cu. m illegal timber (Table 3). Timber extraction 
practically stopped along Abuan River. In San Mariano, the 
logging teams continued operating until the taskforce raided 
clandestine sawmills in June 2009 (Lagasca 2009). Criminal 
cases were fi led in court against middlemen and fi nanciers. The 
provincial director of the DENR was replaced (and promptly 
re-assigned by the DENR Secretary in neighbouring Cagayan 
Province). Deliberately, no legal action was taken against the 
bugadores and atcheros (Severino 2009). 
Local and national media extensively covered the 
enforcement activities in the NSMNP. The anti-illegal logging 
campaign gained Padaca nationwide recognition as a pro-poor, 
green, and reform-oriented politician. Padaca consistently 
linked illegal logging to fl ooding and landslides, and argued 
that the interests of 3,000 poor rural households along the 
forest frontier and the profi ts of seven businessmen should 
not outweigh the massive damage to crops, property, and 
lives that result from fl ooding in Cagayan Valley (Lagasca 
2008c). In 2008, four tropical typhoons claimed more than 
100 lives and caused a damage of about 4.8 billion PHP to 
crops and infrastructure in Cagayan and Isabela. The natural 
calamity reaffi rmed the urgency to control illegal logging, and 
justifi ed the actions of the taskforce in the eyes of the public. 
The urban middle-class is increasingly concerned about the 
environmental impacts of deforestation, indignant about the 
systemic corruption in the public service, and demands political 
reforms and greater accountability of government (Contreras 
2002). But the support for the taskforce was not limited to the 
urban areas of the province, which form the political base of 
Padaca. Many people in the uplands also supported Padaca’s 
stand against illegal logging. Illegal logging epitomises the 
lawlessness in remote forest areas and the marginalisation of 
rural communities (Erni 2006), and many people along the 
forest frontier therefore considered the strict enforcement of 
forest policy a legitimate and positive change (Figure 3). 
The Provincial Anti-illegal Logging Taskforce stopped 
illegal logging in the NSMNP by monitoring illegal hotspots, 
confi scating chainsaws and timber, and prosecuting middlemen 
and corrupt government offi cials (Figure 4). This underlines 
that improving the rule of law, in the form of enforcing existing 
regulations and addressing corruption, is a critical fi rst step 
towards sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation, 
especially in areas where uncontrolled resource extraction will 
lead to irreplaceable environmental damage such as in the 
Northern Sierra Madre (Rudel & Roper 1997; Kishor & Belle 
2004; Ravenel & Granoff 2004; Gibson et al. 2005). 
Empirical case studies of illegal logging operations in 
other protected areas in insular southeast Asia draw similar 
conclusions. For example, McCarthy (2002) describes how 
organisers of illegal logging gangs backed by local government 
offi cials and army offi cers co-opt rural communities living in 
and around the Gunung Leuser National Park in Sumatra to 
harvest timber. Casson & Obidzinski (2002) document how 
illegal logging is deeply entrenched in local economies and 
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of public interest environmental law groups throughout the 
country, such as Tanggol Kalikasan or the Environmental Legal 
Assistance Centre, is a promising development. 
The signboard in San Isidro illustrates the position of poor 
rural communities in the illegal logging operations in the 
NSMNP. Barangay offi cials are trying to extract some lumber 
from the loggers to improve public services in the village. Their 
request was ignored. It is telling that a community living in 
one of the most valuable forests in the country has to beg for 
lumber to construct a church.
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Notes
1. Forest cover in the Philippine archipelago declined from 50% in 
1950 to 24% in 2005 (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2005); the 
remaining lowland forests are severely degraded. Deforestation and 
forest degradation form a major threat to biodiversity (Brooks et al. 
2002; Posa et al. 2008), and contribute signifi cantly to CO2 emissions 
(Lasco & Pulhin 2000). The social and economic costs of deforestation 
are large, and disproportionally affect the rural poor (Broad & Cavanagh 
1993; Goldoftas 2006).
2. The Northern Sierra Madre mountain range covers 4 provinces in 
northeast Luzon: Cagayan, Isabela, Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya.
3. The Luzon Mahogany Timber Corporation (LUZMATIM) was granted 
a concession for 23,543 ha, allowing the company to harvest 15,714 cu. 
m wood per year in Dinapigue, just outside the NSMNP. The concession 
of the Pacifi c Timber Export Corporation (PATECO) covers 33,454 ha 
with an annual allowable cut of 14,900 cu. m in the southern part of 
Isabela province. And the Liberty Logging Corporation annually harvests 
7,135 cu. m in a concession of 25,887 ha, southwest of the NSMNP.
4. In theory, a registered people’s organisation can harvest timber in the 
sustainable use and multiple use zones of the protected area for ‘domestic 
purposes’ (e.g., house construction), under a Protected Area Community-
based Resource Management Agreement (PACBARMA). Private land 
owners in the protected area can apply for a Private Land Timber Permit 
(PLTP). But the DENR has not issued these tenure agreements in the 
NSMNP so far. Timber can be harvested outside the protected areas 
under tenure instruments issued by the DENR. Logging corporations 
operate under an Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). 
Another important legal source of wood in Isabela is the Community-
Based Forest Management (CBFM) program. The DENR issued 12 
Community-based Forest Management Agreements, together covering 
48,065 ha, to people’s organisations in the barangays directly adjacent to 
the NSMNP. Timber can also be legally harvested on public land covered 
by Socialized Industrial Forest Management Agreements (SIFMA): 521 
agreements, totaling 2,789 ha, were issued to smallholders in the buffer 
zone of the NSMNP. These areas are mainly located along the forest 
frontier where farmers have established yemane (Gmelina arborea) 
plantations. These ‘legal sources’ are widely misused to authenticate 
illegal wood from the NSMNP (Nordic Agency for Development and 
Ecology & Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1998).
5. Atcheros and bugadores use the creative verb ‘agillegal’ (doing illegal) 
when they talk about logging. During interviews, middlemen and 
fi nancers acknowledge the illegality of logging operations.
6. The wood industry is well organised and politically infl uential: there are 
three large cooperatives in Isabela that are associated at the regional level 
in the Cagayan Valley Chamber of Furniture Producers Association.
7.  Corruption is defi ned as the abuse of public offi ce for private gains. In the 
literature, a distinction is often made between non-collusive corruption 
in which government offi cials receive a payment for allowing a (semi-)
legal activity such as harvesting fuelwood, and collusive corruption 
in which government offi cials conspire with entrepreneurs to avoid 
regulations and taxes (Laurance 2004; Smith et al. 2007).
8. A Certifi cate of Lumber Origin (CLO) and Certifi cate of Transport 
Agreement (CTA) are required by law, to transport and sell lumber.
9. In Philippine forest policy discourse, a distinction is often made between 
‘small-scale timber-poaching activities’ or ‘carabao logging’ by rural 
communities and ‘large-scale illegal logging’ by logging companies 
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources 2001a: 52), 
implying different degrees of equity, sustainability, and legitimacy. 
But a striking characteristic of the illegal logging operations in the 
Northern Sierra Madre is the continuity over the past forty years, and the 
similarities between the corporate Bataan logging system in the 1970s 
and 1980s and current timber harvesting practices. In fact this historical 
continuity can be extended to the nineteenth century. Bankoff (2009) 
documents how in 1882 rich and infl uential traders (contratistas) from 
Manila ordered wood from middlemen (acopiadores) in the provinces. 
These middlemen often held prominent political positions. They 
organised labor gangs to harvest wood, and bribed forestry government 
offi cials to tolerate destructive harvesting practices.
10. In a fi ercely contested election in May 2004, Grace Padaca, a former 
investigative radio-broadcast journalist, surprisingly defeated the 
incumbent Governor of Isabela, Faustino Dy Jr. The Dy family had 
ruled Isabela for 34 years. Padaca consolidated her position when she 
defeated Ben Dy in the elections in 2007. In the 2010 elections that were 
marred with massive vote-buying and violence, Padaca lost to Faustino 
Dy III with a narrow margin.
11. The Provincial Anti-illegal Logging Taskforce was initiated by a 
democratically elected provincial governor in cooperation with 
grassroots civil society groups, primarily out of concern for the welfare 
of rural communities. To a large extent this is probably the reason for 
its effectiveness and legitimacy in the eyes of most people in Isabela.
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